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Forward to the Past: reinventing intelligence led policing in Britain 
 
On appointment to the most prominent and influential post in British policing, the 
new Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Bernard Hogan-Howe, spoke plainly 
about his strategy for policing England’s capital city. Focusing on the business of 
policing as crime control, he declared that he would employ a ‘Total Policing’ 
strategy in London (hereinafter referred to as TP) to ensure that criminals were 
tackled ‘decisively and directly’ on the basis of ‘accurate and reliable local 
intelligence’ (Metropolitan Police, 2011: 1). His words seemed to signal a new 
commitment to proactivity and intelligence work in British policing. 
 In this paper, drawing on primary research in the form of interviews with 
serving police officers and staff, archival and other secondary documentary material, 
and reflections on my own police career,1 I examine Hogan-Howe’s strategy within a 
wider discussion of the purpose of policing and of other putatively revolutionary 
policing strategies adopted by the police in the modern era.2 I focus on one of the 
most influential of those strategies, intelligence-led policing (ILP) because as the 
reader will see, TP and ILP share the same epistemological roots. As a label attached 
to a diverse variety of intelligence-led strategies, ILP has spread around the globe and 
become (at least at the level of rhetoric) embedded in the policing systems of many 
nation states.   
 Intelligence-led practice in public policing is much older than commonly 
believed. Indeed, ILP is as old as the UK police service itself. Ironically, even though 
ILP strategies have gone on to find favour in many nations, they never really have had 
the impact on mainstream policing in the UK that some would have us believe. Given 
the rhetoric of revolution and reform that has accompanied the announcement of ILP-
inspired initiatives across the developed world (only for them, over time, to fade from 
the collective consciousness without seriously challenging the dominant reactive 
policing paradigm) one is entitled to question the extent to which its most recent 
iteration, TP, provides a template for meaningful reform of modern police agencies. 
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The Purpose of Policing 
Arguments about the duties and responsibilities of the public police inevitably lead to 
a debate which has never, and probably will never, be settled; the true purpose of 
policing. Summarising the nuances and complexities of the argument is no easy task 
but, perhaps crudely put, opinions broadly divide themselves into two ideological 
camps to which the labels force and service have been attached.   
 Despite consistent and credible research evidence to the contrary, those in the 
force camp (including much of the popular media and many of the police themselves) 
express a rather traditional view that the true purpose of the police is crime fighting 
(see for example Reith, 1956). Whilst advocates of the service approach, argue that 
beyond the populist rhetoric, most police work does not involve crime or any kind of 
law enforcement activity. Instead, the police deliver a wide range of services that 
involve ‘something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had 
better do something now!’ (Bittner, 2005: 161).   
The UK police service’s own perspective on its role seems to swing between 
the two poles of service and force according to shifts in the philosophies and ideals of 
its ruling elites. However, those have not always been clear to observers because, 
covertly, senior commanders have employed strategies that they publicly have 
disavowed; the outward packaging of policing has not always described the contents 
entirely accurately. For example, in the early years of Britain’s new police, 
commanders went to great pains to argue that their investigative options were limited 
by the need to dispel the notion that the police represented ‘continental despotism’ in 
the form of ‘standing armies, police spies, lettres de cachet and Bastilles’ (Ignatieff, 
1975: 26).3  
From the outset, they claimed to prioritise the prevention of crime over its 
detection so as to secure public consent for what were highly contentious policing 
arrangements. In fact, plain clothes officers were employed on proactive operations 
from the very earliest days of the public police (The Times, 1830 November 11th cited 
in Rawlings, 2002). Just four years after the establishment of the new police, its 
Commissioners admitted that in the investigation of robbery, ‘We have found it better 
done by persons in plain clothes, who were not thus known to the thieves, both in 
preventing them and in catching them when they have been going in’ (emphasis 
added) (UK Parliamentary Papers, 1833: vol. XII, pages 407). 
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 In the modern era, with the existence of the public police accepted as a simple 
fact of life, commanders have been freer to experiment with alternative strategies.  
Across the developed world, police chiefs have enthusiastically embraced innovative 
strategies that promised improvements in the operational performance of their forces 
beyond those that could be realised by the reactive paradigm alone (see for example 
Tilley (2008) on the subjects of problem-oriented, problem solving and proactive 
policing). However, researchers have questioned whether these ‘new’ approaches 
represent real change or simply serve to reinforce the traditional control elements of 
the rational-legal, bureaucratic, police organisational model (see for example 
Weisburd et al, 2006 for analysis of developments in policing in the United States and 
Gill, 2000 for a British perspective). 
 Notwithstanding that scholarly criticism, it should be no surprise that time and 
again, commanders and policymakers have launched such initiatives with optimistic 
messages emphasising the police’s crime-fighting capabilities and highlighting the 
organisational and personal vigour with which they would be pursued (see for 
example; Bratton (1998) for a police perspective on what popularly, though arguably 
pejoratively, has come to be known as the zero-tolerance policing strategy employed 
in New York City; and Flood (2003) for an explanation of the UK law-enforcement 
community’s hopes for the National Intelligence Model (NIM), which to many 
represented the apotheosis of ILP). 
 Taking visible and decisive action against offenders and, perhaps more 
importantly being seen to take such action, has proved popular both with communities 
and with the police’s political masters. There usually is an enthusiastic audience for 
such pronouncements; not least within the ranks of the service itself where ‘thief-
taking and ‘locking up the bad guys’ is perceived as central to the policing mission.  
Even when voices within the British police service (perhaps most famously, that of 
John Alderson, chief constable of the Devon and Cornwall force 1973-1982) have 
argued for less legalistic approaches that recognise that crime as a phenomenon 
‘arises in part from behaviour but is also created by rules’ (Alderson, 1979: 5), their 
messages have been contested by other insiders and rarely have been popular with 
those on the policing ‘front line’ (Reiner, 2010). 
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Total Policing 
The arrival in Britain of a, much trailed, age of austerity in the public services has 
served to bring crime-fighting and police performance (subjects that have occupied 
successive UK governments since the mid-1970s) into even sharper focus. Against 
that background, the police’s much criticised response to the riots that broke out 
across Britain in the summer of 201,4 caused some to question whether elements of 
the service, particularly the Metropolitan Police, were fit for purpose (see for 
example, Pilkington, 2011).    
 The resignation or retirement of a significant proportion of the Metropolitan 
Police’s command team in the same period cannot be attributed to the fallout from 
that disorder.  Of far greater consequence was media and public concern over the 
influence of the News International Corporation on the police (see for example 
Casciani, 2012: 1). 5  However, both issues are significant in the context of this 
discussion because together, they stimulated an appetite for change that first was 
reflected in the choice of that command team’s replacements and then in the 
repackaging and rebranding of police services in London by that new team, under the 
banner of TP. TP may be viewed as a rational response to the pressure on the force 
from its political masters in this age of austerity, to deliver more with less but it seems 
to me that it is also about doing things and being seen to do things differently, and in 
the process drawing a line under the recent past.   
 It is worth assessing the extent to which, beyond the banner headline, TP 
differs from any other kind of mainstream policing practised around the world.  Innes 
explored the idea of TP in his 2003 book Understanding Social Control. For Innes, 
TP was analogous to the Dutch ‘total football’ of the 1970s, in which players were 
expected to adapt to situations as circumstances unfolded, rather than having their 
responsibilities throughout the game defined by the position for which they originally 
were selected (Innes, 2003). The term was popularised by Hogan-Howe whilst chief 
constable of the Merseyside Police and was common currency by the time he left the 
force in 2009 (Merseyside Police, 2009). In Merseyside, it was claimed that TP 
recognised the value of a single service approach in which all the component parts of 
the force worked together to deliver its strategic aims. The force was, in effect, one 
team contributing to the plan set out by its leaders (Merseyside Police, 2009). 
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 However, Innes (2012) has questioned whether some of the changes that 
Hogan-Howe has made in London (such as re-designating Operation Trident as anti 
‘gangs’ squad). Thus breaking that long-standing and explicit connection with 
London’s black communities) are consistent with the broader philosophy of policing 
that he has advanced, and whether they can deliver the kind of policing that Hogan-
Howe says that he wants.6 Notwithstanding that apparent confusion, other factors 
largely beyond Hogan-Howe’s control (which include the increasing specialisation of 
the British police in the modern era and the fiscal pressures on the public services) 
have the potential to frustrate the Commissioner’s plans and to prevent the reform of 
mainstream policing in the way that he would hope (Innes, 2012). 
 Hogan-Howe (2011: 15) has talked about a ‘total war on crime… to keep the 
criminals on the back foot and support the good people’. A feature of the strategy was 
that every calendar month the force would come together in a single mission to make 
‘a massive impact’ (Hogan-Howe: 2011: 15). One such mission was carried out on 
24th November 2011 when the Commissioner’s rhetoric was made very real for many 
individuals in London. Some 4,000 of his officers and staff carried out Operation 
Hawk (Metropolitan Police, 2011: 1). Raids on properties in every one of the 32 
London boroughs resulted in more than 300 arrests, the seizure of 40 weapons and the 
closure of 14 drugs houses (Metropolitan Police, 2011).   
 Symbolically, the Commissioner took a prominent role in proceedings and he 
was joined ‘in theatre’ by London’s Mayor Boris Johnson who matched the 
Commissioner’s rhetoric with his own warning to criminals to ‘Beware - we're 
stepping up a gear to crack down on the drug dealers, burglars and thieves that make 
our [sic] lives a misery’ (BBC, 2011: 1). That momentum was maintained when 
Operation Hawk was quickly followed by Operation Big Wing which focused on 
combating robbery, burglary and domestic violence in London and further operations 
of that kind have followed.7 
 These TP operations should not be judged solely by their headline results.  
Arguably, they demonstrate a unity of purpose that the past summer’s riots suggested 
was lacking in London’s police. In that context, they were at least an attempt to regain 
the force’s legitimacy in the face of criticism from the public, its political masters and 
even from some of its own members. Also, they were symbolic in that (in a phrase 
much loved by police commanders in the modern era) they ‘sent a message’ to 
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criminals in London that under the new Commissioner, the police were back in 
business with the organisational will, the capacity, and the capability to fight crime in 
the capital.  
In the wake of that first operation, Hogan-Howe gave more details of his 
plans. In his view, TP requires the delivery of consistent, effective and highly visible 
policing, which will be achieved by putting ‘fear into criminals, build[ing] trust with 
the public… doing everything we can that is legal’ (Hogan-Howe, 2011: 15). The 
similarities between the messages promulgated by the Commissioner and by leading 
advocates of ILP in Britain, such as former Deputy Assistant Commissioner (now 
Professor) John Grieve and Sir David Phillips the former president of the Association 
of Chief Police Officers, are stark. In what essentially was a ‘call to arms’ addressed 
to the detective force, Grieve (2008), encouraged his staff to be ‘lawfully audacious’ 
in combating crime. Whilst, Phillips was a committed advocate of the single service 
approach throughout his career (see for example Phillips, 2008).   
Certainly, there are elements of different stratagems in TP. There is some 
acknowledgment of the value of problem oriented policing and also an emphasis on 
communities and localism. However, there can be little doubt that the single service 
approach envisaged, which is intended to unite the whole force; detectives and 
uniforms; specialists and generalists; police officers and support staff, in a single 
mission, locates the plan firmly in the ILP milieu. 
 
Intelligence-Led Policing in Britain 
There is little in TP, at least in spirit, to distinguish it from the innovative strategies 
that were alluded to at the beginning of this paper or that were introduced (albeit in a 
very limited way) by Hogan-Howe’s predecessor Sir Robert Mark, in the 1970s (see 
Mark, 1978). Nor do they differ very much from the strategies that were endorsed 
almost two decades ago by the Audit Commission (1993), and advanced in the UK by 
the Kent force in the 1990s (see Flood, 2003). In each case, the intention was that the 
energies of the organisation would be harnessed together in the cause of a single 
mission; crime reduction. Similarly, accurate and timely intelligence was considered 
essential to the mission’s success. One of Hogan-Howe’s predecessors, who also 
championed intelligence, Sir John Stevens (2001), argued that in formulating strategy, 
commanders should focus on their relations with communities because that was where 
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most police activity was undertaken but for many years local intelligence work was 
not considered a priority for commanders and it has proved difficult to break with the 
reactive policing paradigm of the past (see for example Grieve, 2004 and HMIC, 
1997).   
 In the UK today, ILP strategies are underpinned (at least in principle) by the 
National Intelligence Model (NIM) (National Criminal Intelligence Service, 1999).  
However, some commentators (including Kleiven, 2006 and John and Maguire 2004) 
have argued that the NIM, lauded as the mechanism through which ILP would be 
integrated within the culture of all forces, has had little meaningful impact on 
operational practice. My own research tended to support that view. 
 In practice, the term ILP has been confusingly applied to a variety of discrete 
‘crime-fighting’ processes that rely on the efforts of analysts and intelligence 
specialist engaged in ‘crime mapping’, ‘crime pattern analysis’, ‘data analysis’ and 
other ‘problem-solving’ approaches (see for example Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2002; 
Heaton, 2000). There is another dimension to ILP which also relies on analysts and 
other specialists but in this second case the emphasis is on the targeting of groups or 
individuals using covert methods with their arrest, or some other intervention to 
prevent further offending, the intended outcome (see for example Peterson, 2005; 
Maguire and John, 1995). My research found that most analytical activity fell into the 
first category and that as Collier (2006) in his evaluation of the NIM had discovered 
before me, there was a tendency to put a disproportionate emphasis on acquiring and 
organising knowledge rather than utilising it in productive ways. 
 Beyond those approaches, other novel intelligence-led strategies also have 
come to the fore. I argue that each has challenged but largely failed to overcome the 
traditional reactive policing paradigm. Arguably, it was the introduction of Unit Beat 
Policing (UBP) in Britain in 1967 that provided the foundation for modern ILP.8 As 
the reader will see, UBP also established the local intelligence system on which the 
modern intelligence structure in Britain is based. The introduction of the collator, an 
individual tasked with collecting and evaluating information collected by patrol 
officers, (see Wilmer, 1970) was a significant milestone in the development of 
intelligence-led strategies and the specialisation of the police workforce. Though 
some researchers (including Reiner, 2010 and Waddington, 1999) have been critical 
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of the police’s ‘down-grading’ of the patrol function that seemed to accompany those 
developments. 
 Commonly, the development of ILP strategies has been linked to increasing 
concerns about organised crime (see for example Wright, 2005; Sheptycki, 2004), the 
search for ‘better evidence’ following the discrediting of strategies that ultimately 
relied on suspects’ confessions (see for example Maguire, 2008), and the availability 
of increasingly sophisticated technologies in the modern era (see for example 
Ratcliffe, 2008; Manning, 2001). From an Australian perspective, Chan (2003: 656) 
suggested that the appeal of ILP to police commanders was that it promised new, 
problem-solving, intelligence-led approaches for dealing with increasingly 
sophisticated and prolific offenders. Whilst, Reiner (2010: 23) argued that it seemed 
to provide a solution to the problems associated with traditional policing tactics which 
were ‘spread too thinly over the multitude of potential victims and offenders to be 
able to achieve much preventative cover or detection’. 
 The UK Audit Commission was a significant actor in the search for ‘best 
value’ in Britain’s public sector. Its report on ILP, Helping with Enquiries: Tackling 
Crime Effectively (1993), argued for intelligence-led, crime reduction strategies that 
targeted scarce operational resources against the criminal rather than the crime. It had 
a considerable impact on the Home Office and on the police service and stimulated a 
significant shift in policing discourse. However, what was then lauded as ground-
breaking, simply restated observations made by police commanders at least 60 years 
earlier.9 This highlights that there is little that is truly new in policing; it also suggests 
that the police’s organisational memory may be less efficient than some might 
imagine.   
 Reiner (2000: 217) argued that there were sufficient, well-researched 
examples of innovative policing strategies to suggest that targeted policing can 
succeed in having a ‘significant, if modest’ effect on crime and the fear of crime. By 
that analysis, TP may indeed deliver marginal gains for the police. However, Skogan 
(2008: 23) observed that though there was enthusiasm among ‘academics and the 
informed public’ for ILP strategies, for policymakers and police commanders ‘the 
political risks involved are considerable, and efforts to change the police often fall far 
short or fail’. Gill (2000) questioned whether ILP truly represented a fundamental 
transformation of policing in the modern era or whether it was something that simply 
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was bolted-on to existing structures. As the reader will see, in the UK it has usually 
been the latter approach that has prevailed. 
 
Unit Beat Policing 
UBP is particularly significant in this narrative because its architects also sought to 
reconfigure policing to deliver the single service approach favoured by Phillips, 
Hogan-Howe and other British commanders in the modern era.  When it was 
introduced, UBP (just like Phillips’ ILP and Hogan-Howe’s TP) was hailed by its 
supporters as the panacea for policing’s ills. Today, there is almost universal 
agreement that UBP was a complete failure. At best, it was ‘misconceived’ (Newburn, 
2003: 59); at worst ‘a disaster’ (Mainwaring-White in Newburn, 2003: 60). 
 Even though the UBP experiment was conducted more than 40 years ago, it is 
hugely relevant in the context of this discussion because it represented the first 
comprehensive attempt to revolutionise British policing and the roots of Britain’s 
modern police local intelligence system may be found in that experiment. Its failure 
should act as a warning to police commanders and to policymakers that the challenges 
to the success of the ‘single service’ mission are many and various.  
 In the spring of 1967, following experiments carried out by the Home Office 
in the north of England and in Wales, a small-scale UBP scheme was piloted in 
Kirkby, Lancashire.10 Results from the pilot were equivocal; researchers found that it 
produced fast responses to calls from the public for assistance but ‘communication 
with the public was diminished and therefore information did not flow’ (Rand, 1970: 
14). Therefore, the deficit in intelligence (on which so much depended) was obvious 
to commanders from the very beginning of the experiment. 
 That lesson seemed to be learnt, for when the study was extended to 
Accrington Lancashire, an attempt was made to amalgamate the best features of the 
Kirkby pilot with pre-existing schemes from the Netherlands, which emphasised the 
efficacy of foot patrol. Mobile patrols were supplemented with roughly twice the 
number of foot patrols (Rand, 1970). The (putative) success of this second pilot led to 
calls for a further experiment in a major conurbation and on 3rd July 1967, UBP was 
introduced throughout the city of Birmingham.   
 Summing up the concerns of many about the limited evaluation of UBP, Rand 
(1970:15) commented that in just one year, UBP had: 
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gone from a small experimental scheme to total adoption in an entire 
police force.  [even though] there had not been time to ascertain if there 
was any significant difference in crime figures, nor had there really been 
time to allow operational problems to show themselves properly.  Even in 
1970, it is arguable that there has been an insufficient time interval to 
satisfactorily review the trends in the matter. 
Some data was produced to ‘prove’ that UBP could deliver the gains the 
Home Office wanted. For example, it was claimed that its introduction in Newcastle 
upon Tyne in March 1967 had resulted in an 8.3 percent fall in recorded crime and an 
increase in the detection rate from 40.8 percent to 45.1 percent (Williamson, 1971: 5).  
Results like these persuaded the Newcastle force to go ahead with full 
implementation. However, some questioned the accuracy of the figures that were 
produced to justify the scheme; to Williamson (1971: 5) they were ‘spurious’. 
Home Office enthusiasm for UBP was clear; adoption often meant tangible 
rewards for police commanders (a carrot and stick approach that will be familiar to 
commanders in the modern era). For example, ‘more equipment – cars and radios’ 
was made available to local commanders in Newcastle (Williamson, 1971: 6). 
However, few attempts were made to sell the project to the rank and file and any 
marketing of the change was directed solely at the police elite. Two thirds of all the 
constables affected by the change were not given any choice in their new duties; the 
lack of discussion with staff associations led the Newcastle Police Federation to make 
a formal complaint to the chief constable (Williamson, 1971: 10).11  
 Just like the ILP initiatives that have succeeded it, UBP relied on timely and 
accurate dissemination of intelligence to the front line. The ‘collator’ an individual 
(usually a uniformed constable) was appointed in each division. They were tasked 
with recording, analysing and evaluating (at a rudimentary level) information 
collected by local officers (Rogers, 2004: 3). The police expected it to produce ‘an 
entirely new era in police records’ in which information about communities and 
individuals would no longer be lost whenever an officer transferred, resigned or 
retired from the force (Gospel et al, 1969: 11).   
 The collator system represented the first real separation of intelligence work 
from mainstream operational policing in Britain. The aim was to improve the quality 
of intelligence through specialisation but there were unintended consequences. Much 
of the information recorded by frontline staff was perceived to have little intelligence 
value (Gregory, 1967). Those same staff frequently complained that the information 
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they provided simply disappeared into a black hole (Wilmer, 1970). However, the fact 
that unfocused collection failed to benefit the wider organisation indicated significant 
shortcomings in communication between the intelligence and operational milieus. 
 Often, the best sources of intelligence were kept from the collator and patrol 
officers. Information from informers, described in interview by a former detective 
inspector as the ‘life blood’ of detectives, was never entered into the local intelligence 
system. Then, as today, there were principles of ‘need to know’ and ‘duty of care’ 
(particularly in relation to the well-being and safety of the informer) to be considered.  
However, a former South London collator questioned the extent to which decisions to 
withhold information in that era relied on any rational cost-benefit analyses. In his 
view, detectives kept information to themselves because, quite simply, ‘knowledge 
was power’ therefore it would never be shared.   
 In the same vein, a former West London collator described detectives’ ‘night 
raids’ on his office when they would not need to account for their presence and could 
research the intelligence records unobserved and unhindered. It was the experience of 
a member of the police elite, interviewed for this research, that detectives made a 
contribution to local intelligence but ‘it was on their terms… historical rather than 
current’ and therefore in practice rather less valuable. Respondents argued that there 
was little recognition by the detective force of the benefits of a ‘single service’ 
approach in this period. 
Despite the fanfare that accompanied their establishment, collators were never 
seen as central either to the formulation of policing strategy or to the investigative 
effort. As much as anything, their regular reassignment from intelligence work to fill 
gaps elsewhere (see Coe et al, 1968; Gregory, 1967), revealed commanders’ real 
estimation of collators’ worth.  Unsurprisingly, many felt that the collator system was 
the weak link in the UBP chain (Gearon et al, 1968). That encouraged the idea that 
they largely were unimportant and ineffectual; an idea that quickly took root in police 
research (see for example Wilmer, 1970). 
Moreover, the new system did not address the fragmentation of the national 
intelligence system (Gregory, 1967). That is to say, that the arrangements for passing 
intelligence around the local divisions, force headquarters, and the newly formed 
Regional Crime Squads were not improved in any meaningful way.12 The result was 
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that the British police service continued to operate in the separate and discrete silos 
familiar to many who take an interest in policing today. 
UBP’s impact was intended to be felt far beyond intelligence work.  Inspectors 
would become strategists directing the daily work of sergeants who, rather than 
spending time checking up on constables, would utilise their forces’ new mobility to 
become leaders and tacticians. Gregory (1967: 8) imagined ‘a sergeant in the early 
hours… marshalling his [sic] units and carrying out a sweep through the area, 
checking persons and property’. In reality, that was little more than a pipe-dream; the 
reactive paradigm continued to dominate (see Wilmer, 1970; Williamson, 1971). 
There was public resistance too, to the new policing methods. In Durham, 
many complaints were received about the low visibility of the police, particularly in 
town and city centres (Gearon et al, 1969).  In rural areas of Bedfordshire, the system 
had to be ‘adapted’ to meet low levels of crime and problems with radio coverage 
(Evans et al, 1968). A major issue across England and Wales was the shortage of staff 
available to implement the new patrol strategy, which the police attributed to Home 
Office limits on recruitment (Coe et al, 1968; Gearon et al, 1968). That suggested 
both an inability to manage the demand for policing services and the 
inappropriateness of the patrol strategy. Ultimately, the redeployment of ‘street 
police’ to motor vehicles to create ‘car police’, did not achieve the improvements that 
police commanders or those in the Home Office expected.   
 The silo mentality, which has always undermined notions of a single service, 
was never more obvious than in the separate paths taken by the uniformed and 
detective branches of the service under UBP. The popular perception of the changes 
brought about by UBP (reinforced by popular British police dramas of the era) is that 
it was focused almost exclusively on the uniform department. However, the CID was 
expected to play an important role with divisional detectives being part of the new 
‘area’ units so that the car beats would have been supplemented both by uniformed 
foot patrols and detectives (Gregory, 1967). In practice the CID’s involvement varied 
from force to force. In some cases, its involvement was desultory (see Coe et al 1969 
and Gearon et al, 1969); in others, it participated but proved incapable of properly 
managing the new caseloads (see Evans et al, 1968; Watson et al, 1969; Gospel et al, 
1969; Bennison et al, 1968). Overall, there simply was not the standardisation that 
was expected (Coe et al, 1969 and Gospel et al, 1969).   
13 
 
Few meaningful efforts were made to bridge that divide. Summing up the 
relationship, Rawlings (2006: 65) noted that though UBP provided new opportunities 
for improved ‘cooperation and information flow between the uniform and detective 
branches’, the cultural divide between the two was never overcome because the 
strategy was presented by police managers without real conviction. Even where silos 
were broken down, there was only a very limited commitment to joint working.   
   
Discussion 
It is almost half a century since UBP was introduced in Britain but the issues that its 
implementation raises are as relevant today as they were then. Just like TP, UBP was 
meant to revolutionise policing. The collator system introduced as part of the 
experiment was expected to revolutionise intelligence work in the mainstream to 
support a more flexible and fluid patrol strategy. However, it failed to deliver any 
meaningful improvement in policing services.   
 Accurate and timely intelligence is key to the success of ILP initiatives but in 
the UK the problems of collecting, evaluating and, above all, using local intelligence 
in productive ways have run deep. Despite the development of local intelligence units 
from the collator system, too often they have been seen as adjuncts to the real 
business of policing (see for example Cope, 2004). A former senior detective, a 
trainer at the Bramshill Police College, said that many senior officers could not be 
made to understand that ‘if you don’t make any investment in intelligence then you 
will get back exactly what you put in’. Moreover, the influence of intelligence 
assessments and local intelligence units in shaping commanders’ priorities often was 
limited by a failure to reconcile bottom-up intelligence assessments with the top-down 
demands of central government (see Heaton, 2000; Innes and Fielding, 2002).   
 This was a significant failing in the cases I studied in my research into Sir 
David Phillips’ creation, the NIM. In one, an analyst commented that commanders 
saw the intelligence assessments they produced as ‘paper exercises’ that did not 
influence day-to-day business. Whilst another in a second case said that there was no 
one at the elite level of their force who truly believed in the value of intelligence.  I 
infer not that commanders were ignorant of the value of intelligence but rather that 
their primary focus was always on meeting centrally-imposed performance targets for 
priority crime (usually burglary, robbery and theft involving motor vehicles) even 
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when intelligence assessments indicated that second-order criminality, petty crime, 
was of greater concern to their communities; an unintended consequence of the UK 
police performance regime, which has often been highlighted by researchers (see for 
example Loveday, 2006).13 
NIM implementation was further complicated by the contemporaneous 
introduction across Britain of another putative ‘revolution’, neighbourhood policing; 
an extension of the existing community policing programme that made extensive use 
of police auxiliaries (in the UK termed Community Support Officers). The potential 
for friction between the two change programmes; the NIM focused on priority crime, 
the neighbourhood policing programme on second order criminality, should have 
been obvious from the outset. However, few attempts were made to coordinate their 
implementation. The problems created were not confined to the day-to-day business 
of reconciling competing demands. They extended to the very top of the police 
pyramid where competition between the two provided a focus for rivalry between 
those committed to a public reassurance agenda and others wedded to the idea of 
policing as crime control.  
Under the NIM regime, commanders should have placed a greater value on 
their bottom-up intelligence analyses than they had hitherto. Policing is never quite 
that simple; decisions about resource allocation are inherently political. With finite 
resources, a commander’s decision to favour one crime type or one geographic area, 
always disadvantages other types or areas. More effective use of intelligence could at 
least provide an evidence base for command decisions but the pressure to meet the 
demands of central government and the expectations of communities in the modern 
era; in effect to do or at least to be seen as trying to do everything – to cover all bases, 
often has been too great. Police officers are ‘can do’ kind of people.  However, in my 
experience, we rarely reflected effectively enough on our work. Whether a task was 
completed in the most efficient or cost-effective way or even whether it should have 
been undertaken at all, were matters that were seldom considered (it is no coincidence 
that of all the analytical techniques available to police analysts, the one used the least 
is results analysis). 
 Despite the high profile Government--commissioned Bichard Inquiry into the 
events surrounding the Soham murders (Bichard, 2004),14 the seeming inability of the 
police to use intelligence effectively enough to underpin protective services or to 
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properly direct operational activities has been commented upon in many studies (see 
for example, Phillips, 2008; Cope, 2008, 2004 and 2003; Maguire and John, 2006; 
Innes and Fielding, 2002; Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005; Grieve, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004 
and Gill, 2000). Whilst some failings were the result of individual shortcomings, 
others were organisational. A chief police officer expressed his regrets that the service 
had not been more robust in its response to Bichard.  He said that the opportunity to 
talk about the failure of intelligence was missed. Data protection was only a small part 
of the problem yet this is what, in the main, Bichard had focused upon and the police 
elite had not challenged that effectively enough.  
 Some attempts have been made to manage demand, to free up resources that 
can be targeted against identified priorities. Case screening procedures (that ‘screen 
out’ investigations, which appear unsolvable) have been embraced in Britain and 
across the developed world. Screening can allow commanders to use resources that 
would not otherwise be available to them, to undertake longer-term problem-solving 
strategies. It also can make a significant contribution to their efforts to do more with 
less. However, it has not always been popular with communities conditioned, by 
successive governments and by the service itself, to expect the police to respond to 
every public complaint (see for example Braga et al, 2001).   
 This issue goes to the heart of police legitimacy. A balance must be struck 
between the capacity and capability of the public police and the normative 
expectations of communities. Of course, that equation can be modified either by 
improving the delivery of policing services or by changing public expectations but, 
for a variety of reasons, the latter has rarely been considered acceptable. Instead, there 
have been any number of attempts to reform policing in ways that have sought to 
reshape government and public identification of its limits. By that analysis, the 
relatively modest changes introduced by UBP were dressed up in the values of the 
time; scientific progress and modernisation, to overcome public and political disquiet 
about police performance.  Some of the ILP strategies of the more recent past can also 
be seen in that light. 
 In my own research into ILP in the UK I found that very much the majority 
view in policing was that any commander’s freedom to deploy their tactical resources 
was strictly limited by the ordinary expectations of the police as an emergency public 
service. More than one respondent talked about the need for commanders to ‘live in 
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the day’. The challenge for commanders was to carry out those routine policing 
functions (referred to by one of my respondents as ‘the background policing’, by 
another as the ‘ordinary day-to-day work of detection’, and by Goldstein (1979: 238) 
as ‘the conglomeration of unrelated, ill-defined, and often inseparable jobs that the 
police are expected to handle’) but to bring the relatively small amounts of resources 
that were left, to bear against high-priority areas in proactive ways. 
 One commander said that he believed that ‘85-90 percent’ of police business 
would be carried on irrespective of any attempt to manage it strategically.  He 
explained, ‘It is all about focus… In effect, there’s just loads of stuff happening which 
you have no control over, detectives going to scenes, [crime scene examiners] going 
out, officers arresting people… You don’t really have control’. Gill’s (2000) 
argument that ILP has not really represented a fundamental shift in policing was 
certainly borne out in my research. As little as 3.5 percent of the operational resources 
in the police areas I examined were devoted to proactive policing. ILP implemented 
via the structures and processes of the NIM certainly did not represent the paradigm 
shift in policing that some would have us believe have taken place.   
 What those statements demonstrate is that there can be a very wide gap 
between rhetoric and reality in British policing.  The ‘reality gap’ is not unique to 
Britain.  For example, research into the greatly acclaimed COMPSTAT system in the 
US, found that COMPSTAT departed markedly from what had been promised and did 
not “represent a radical transformation in the way these departments have done 
business” rather, they had “transplanted some new ways of doing business without 
making much change to some very fundamental structures of police organizations’ 
(Willis et al, 2003a: 77).   
 These examples reveal much about the ability (or perhaps more accurately, the 
inability) of the police to reshape the social environment. Reiner (2011: 1) has argued 
for a fundamental re-evaluation of the limits of the public police in the modern era.  
He noted that the very notion that the main purpose of the police is catching criminals 
is ‘utterly misconceived’. Perhaps, Manning (1977: 17-18) has articulated the 
challenge that the public police face in this context, better than most. He argued that 
as they cannot control crime, the police can only ever hope to present the appearance 
of control. They are: 
The targets for ever-increasing public demand for a level of public order 
and crime prevention they cannot possibly fulfil. They, like any other 
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reasonable organisation faced with an environment it cannot control, an 
indifferent audience seldom moved to cooperative action, and massive 
discrepancies between their claims and their accomplishments, have 
resorted to the dramatic management of the appearance of effectiveness 
(Manning, 1977: 19-20).   
 
By that analysis UBP, ILP, and TP may be rational and responsible policing strategies 
but they can also be interpreted as highly symbolic devices through which the public 
police periodically has reaffirmed its commitment to crime fighting.   
   
Conclusion   
Despite the rhetoric, policing largely remains the business of reacting to events. TP 
essentially is ILP, albeit ILP reinvented for a twenty-first century audience. In 
assessing the prospects for TP and other similarly ‘revolutionary’ policing strategies 
around the world, different criteria should be applied depending upon the audience for 
that assessment.   
 On one hand, the likely impact of TP (or indeed any other new policing 
strategy) on the policing and social worlds is debateable. In the UK, the record 
amount of money spent on policing over the last 30 years, much of it on the 
commissioning and financing of ILP and neighbourhood policing initiatives, has not 
had the expected outcome of solving social ills. That does not mean that the police 
have not aspired to excellence; or to be as efficient, as effective, as ethically sound, 
and as reflexive as they can be. However, it does imply that there are limits to what 
more officers, more money, more Government support and more innovative policing 
strategies can achieve. That suggests that a realistic reappraisal of the limits of the 
public police is long overdue.  
 On the other hand, in terms of the success of the TP mission, I argue that it is 
more likely to be considered successful by policymakers and police commanders if 
those same policymakers and commanders learn the lessons of the past.  Specifically, 
the Commissioner and his command team will need to ensure that his intelligence 
units are capable of collecting accurate and reliable local intelligence, and that they 
can use it in productive ways. Commanders must be reflexive and balance the hitting 
of performance targets (however they are set) with appropriate responses both to their 
own intelligence assessments and to the concerns of their communities. Moreover, the 
Commissioner will need to harness the energies of his force in a single mission, and 
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maintain its focus in the face of existing threats and of those other threats that are 
bound to emerge from beyond what is now the operational horizon. If those 
endeavours: send a consistent message; achieve marginal gains in terms of crime 
reduction and public confidence in the police; and are accompanied by meaningful 
improvements in operational efficiency (no mean feats in themselves) then Hogan-
Howe can proclaim TP a success. Ultimately, perhaps that is as much as any police 
chief can realistically hope to achieve in the modern era. 
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1 The archival data were collected from Britain’s National Archives at Kew or from the National Police 
Library, Bramshill, Hampshire.  The Bramshill data were primary research studies carried out between 
1967 and 1969 across England. The studies were completed by officers participating in the Bramshill 
‘Special Course’ – a programme for future police leaders.  To the best of my knowledge, none of that 
data previously has been the subject of scholarly research. 
2 Primary data were collected in the course of my doctoral research into intelligence-led policing 
models introduced into British policing in the modern era.  I conducted primary research, which 
included interviews with chief officers, Home Office officials, senior police officers and staff.  I carried 
out ethnographic research in two police divisions.  See James, Adrian (2012). The Influence of 
Intelligence-Led Policing Models on Investigative Policy and Practice in Mainstream Policing 1993-
2007: Division, Resistance and Investigative Orthodoxy.  Ph.D. thesis, Department of Social Policy, 
London School of Economics and Political Science.  Available online at etheses.lse.ac.uk/221/ 
3 Lettres de cachet - in pre-revolutionary France, the means by which an individual could be sentenced 
without trial.   The letters and the Bastille fortress represented symbols of an oppressive regime. 
4 The riots began in North London following the police shooting of a suspect.  They also triggered the 
outbreak of ‘copycat’ disturbances in several British cities.   
5 Assistant Commissioner John Yates retired during the course of a police investigation into phone 
hacking by private investigators hired by News International, the proprietors of the now defunct News 
of the World newspaper.  Commissioner Paul Stephenson stood down following an investigation into 
the employment of a former News International executive as a Metropolitan Police press adviser.  Both 
were later cleared of any wrongdoing.    
6 Operation Trident is a long established specialist detective force that hitherto has been responsible for 
investigating murder and gun crime in London’s black communities.  It has now been redesignated as 
the ‘Gang Command’. 
7  Big Wing was a controversial strategy employed by RAF Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain.  
It involved large formations of fighter aircraft deployed in mass sweeps against the Luftwaffe over the 
English Channel and northern Europe.  Its critics claimed that this meant that the fighters were not 
always available when needed and targets became more vulnerable to bombing attacks.  The full 
significance of the phrase in the policing context is unclear but there is an obvious parallel in the 
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deployment of large numbers of officers to carry out coordinated strikes.  Of course, the same criticism 
that was levelled at RAF commanders could also apply to the police; Big Wing operations that take 
officers and staff away from their ordinary duties could mean that neighbourhoods may equally be as 
vulnerable and unprotected. 
8 Though the UBP system represented the first comprehensive attempt at ILP it may not have been the 
first attempt to revolutionise police patrol in Britain.  Sir Harold Scott, Commissioner of the UK’s 
Metropolitan Police at the end of the Second World War described in Scotland Yard (Scott, 1954), the 
‘Aberdeen Scheme’; a system of mechanized team policing in which the city was divided into districts, 
each policed by a team of constables under the command of a sergeant who was empowered to arrange 
the duties of his men as he thought fit.  Provided with a police car and two-way telephony, the sergeant 
would keep in touch with his headquarters and transport men wherever they were required.  Scott 
trialled the system in London but the experiment ended when he left the service in 1953. 
9 The archived minutes of the deliberations of the UK Home Office Committee on Detective Work, 
record an interesting observation by Wilson, then chief constable of Cardiff, that the scope of detective 
work should be increased by ‘working from the criminal to the crime rather than from the crime to the 
criminal’. He suggested that in the event of an ‘epidemic of crime’ of the same type, the police should 
‘keep a careful watch on likely suspects’ and that detective strengths should take this into account 
(PRO MEPO 2/4967, meeting minutes, Section 217).  Evidently, the targeting of suspect individuals or 
populations, was considered by the police many years before it was endorsed by the UK Audit 
Commission in 1993. 
10 The Home Office is the UK’s lead government department for immigration and passports, drugs 
policy, crime, counter-terrorism and police. 
11 The Police Federation is the police staff association.  It represents officers up to the rank of chief 
inspector and operates like a trade union but without the freedom to strike or otherwise withdraw 
officers' labour. 
12 Regional Crime Squads were introduced in 1964 to combat cross-border offending.  They were later 
amalgamated into the National Crime Squad and later still that was subsumed into Britain’s Serious 
Organised Crime Agency. 
13 In June 2010, the UK’s Home Secretary Theresa May announced that police performance targets 
would be abolished in the cause of reconnecting the people with the police (Home Office, 2010) 
14 The Soham murders – in 2002, two 10 year old girls were murdered by school caretaker, Ian Huntley 
in Soham, Cambridgeshire.  It subsequently transpired that the police in the north of England held 
intelligence that would have prevented Huntley from taking up employment at a school.  However, that 
had not been shared with the Cambridgeshire force. 
